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California's Three Strikes Law: Symbol and
Substance
Edward J. Erler* and Brian P. Janiskee**
INTRODUCTION
In November 1999, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the
University of California, Berkeley, released a study by Franklin
Zimring, Sam Kamin, and Gordon Hawkins entitled Crime and
Punishment in California: The Impact of Three Strikes and You're
Out.' In the Fall 2000 issue of the Duquesne Law Review, we pub-
* Professor, Department of Political Science, California State University, San Ber-
nardino
** Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, California State University,
San Bernardino
1. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, ET AL., CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA: THE IMPACT
OF THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT 4 (1999). Hereinafter "Zimring" will be used to identify
the authors of this study and the PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY book referred to infra.
This study was revised and expanded for Oxford University Press in 2001 and appeared
with a new title: Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You're Out in California.
The principal finding of the study was that California's Three Strikes law had failed to
deter crime. The legislation, in the view of Zimring, simply established a punitive regime
that was not grounded in any "explicit penal theory." FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON
HAWKINS, SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN
CALIFORNIA 51 (2001). Indeed, the California Three Strikes law is the harshest in the
nation. The first two strikes must be serious or violent felonies, but the third strike can be
triggered by any felony. A second strike conviction carries double the normal sentence and
a third strike conviction mandates a sentence of 25 years to life. The Three Strikes law (AB
971) was enacted by the legislature and signed by Governor Pete Wilson on March 7, 1994.
AB 971 was passed as an urgency measure-requiring a two-thirds majority in each cham-
ber-due, in large part, to the popularity of the impending statutory initiative proposal that
eventually was passed as Proposition 184 in November 1994. The two measures were vir-
tually identical.
Zimring arrived at his principal conclusion by means of an analysis of a sample of
arrest records from the cities of Los Angles, San Diego and San Francisco. They collected
one pre-Three Strikes sample from March 1993 and two post-Three Strikes samples from
April 1994 and April 1995. Within each sample, Zimring used incarceration records to
classify each felon as having no prior strike, one strike, two strikes, or three strikes. They
found that before the law went into effect 13.9 percent of the arrests in the samples in-
volved felons specifically targeted by the law. After the law went into effect the number
was 12.8 percent. According to Zimring, "[t]his difference is not statistically significant, so
it is not prudent to assume there was any decline in the share of crime committed by those
targeted in the new law." ZIMRING, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY, supra.
Furthermore, Zimring contended that "[t]here is a large gap between the
substantial declines in crime in California that started in 1991 and have continued to 1999
and the detectable impact of three strikes. Whatever has reduced crime in California over
the mid-1990s, it does not appear that the 1994 legislation played a major role." Id.
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lished our critique of the Zimring Study.2 In the Spring 2002 is-
sue of the Duquesne Law Review, Zimring and Kamin responded
to our critique.3 Also in the Spring 2002 issue was a response to
our critique by Professor Michael Vitiello.
4
2. Brian P. Janiskee and Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An
Analysis of the Case Against California's Three Strikes Law, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 43 (2000).
We believed we had detected a series of methodological and analytical errors in the Zimring
study that cast doubt on its reliability. The first involved the timing of the samples. The
Three Strikes law went into effect in March of 1994. Zimring took his first post-Three
Strikes sample only one month after the law's implementation and the second and final
sample barely one year after the law was in place. We argued that the timing of the sam-
ples, which were taken so soon after the law went into effect, "set the bar unreasonably
high for judging the success or failure of Three Strikes." Id. at 47. Zimring did not perform
a standard test for lag effects, which is a common methodological safeguard in social and
behavioral research.
Next, we took issue with their claim that Three Strikes had no incapacitation effect.
Linda Beres and Thomas Griffith point out that any crime reduction as a result of incapaci-
tation would be impossible to detect until 1997. Id. at 48 (citing Linda Beres and Thomas
Griffith, Did "Three Strikes" Cause the Recent Drop in California Crime? An Analysis of the
California Attorney General's Report, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 117(1998)). This is because
most of the felons convicted under Three Strikes would still have received sentences under
the old system that would have kept them in prison until 1997 or beyond.
Another problem with their study was what we called the conflation of arrests and
crime. In their three-city sample, Zimring compared arrest records before and after the
law's implementation. In these samples, they did not measure the number of actual
crimes, but used arrests as a proxy for crime. We expressed concern that the use of such a
proxy underestimated the deterrent effect of the law. Furthermore, several of the arrests
in the April 1994 sample would almost certainly have been for crimes committed prior to
the enactment of the law on Mar 7, 1994 and, therefore, could not be a valid measure of the
deterrent impact of Three Strikes. In addition, Zimring, in what was purportedly an analy-
sis of crime and punishment in California, did not collect statewide or even countywide
data, but simply derived their conclusions from a sample of city data.
We also took issue with the main conclusion of Zimring that there was no deterrent
effect of the law on either the targets of the legislation or in general. Using data from the
Uniform Crime Report, we found that there was evidence of a precipitous and dramatic
decline in crime in the years following the enactment of Three Strikes. In addition, we
offered an analysis of Three Strikes jurisprudence in light of the Romero decision, conclud-
ing that Three Strikes was likely to survive constitutional challenge. We argued that,
contrary to the hopes of many Three Strikes opponents, the law was more defensible after
the Romero decision than before.
3. Franklin E. Zimring and Sam Kamin, Facts, Fallacies, and California's Three
Strikes, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 605 (2002).
4. Michael Vitiello, Somewhat Frantic: A Brief Response to Crime, Punishment and
Romero, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 615 (2002). In the course of our analysis, we described much of
the academic opposition to Three Strikes as "somewhat frantic," as it heatedly decried the
influence of "public panic" on crime policy. In doing so, we cited Professor Vitiello as a
prime example of the prevailing frenetic character of the Three Strikes literature. Accord-
ing to Professor Vitiello, we displayed a fundamental misunderstanding of the institutional
structure of the American regime because we failed to understand the extent to which
legislative deliberation-as opposed to direct democracy-is the core of republican govern-
ment. What particularly piqued his ire, however, was the fact that we characterized him
and Zimring as "radical reformers" who wanted to replace the Three Strikes regime with
the regime of experts. According to Vitiello, the influence of "mob rule" in the passage of
Three Strikes was palpable. And it was, after all, the fear of "mob rule" that inspired the
Three Strikes: Symbol and Substance
The fundamental defect of the Zimring study and all similar
statistical studies is that the world of probability is substituted for
common sense. Zimring found that Three Strikes had no deter-
rent effect. This "finding" was widely reported by a sympathetic
media. The message was simple: harsher sentences meted out to
habitual criminals do not have a significant impact on crime.
Therefore, the public's "anti-offender sentiments"5 are unscientific
and consequently illegitimate. Crime and punishment have been
deconstructed. Following the logic of this deconstruction, punish-
ment has no relation to crime or the crime rate. Indeed, the puni-
tive regime of Three Strikes is wholly irrational and therefore
somehow immoral. The commonsense conclusion, however, offers
a different prospect. When a small class of habitual criminals who
commit a disproportionate number of crimes is incarcerated for
long periods, it is inevitable that crime will decline and that the
crime rate among these criminals will fall nearly to zero (some
will, of course, continue to commit crimes against fellow inmates
and guards while incarcerated). Even Zimring is forced to admit
that while "[t]he specially targeted groups in the Three Strikes
system may not commit different types of offenses than the gen-
eral offending population, . . . they certainly do commit a larger
number of felonies."' Whether Three Strikes deters other felons
within or outside "the specially target groups" is a moot point
since the purpose of Three Strikes "is to remove repeat offenders
from society for long periods of time, if not for life."7
I. PROGRESSIVISM AND ACADEMIC ORTHODOXY
Professors Zimring and Vitiello represent academic orthodoxy in
the debate over Three Strikes. Academic defenses of Three
Strikes are rare; critics, on the other hand, are legion.' At the
framers of the Constitution to institute republican government. Id. at 616. Republican
government, so the argument goes, was designed to insulate lawmakers and policymakers
from direct public influence. Whenever the public intrudes upon lawmaking or policymak-
ing "mob rule" is the inevitable result. Professors Vitiello, Zimring and Kamin therefore
see themselves as supporters of republican government, standing as a vital line of defense
against the irrational impulses of the masses and their "popular passions." Id.
5. Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the Decline of Expert
Authority: Some Reflections on 'Three Strikes' in California, 28 PAC. L.J. 243, 255 (1996).
6. ZIMRING, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 51.
7. Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of Califor-
nia's Two-and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUDIES 159, 160 (2002).
8. A LEXIS/NEXIS search of law review articles for the past two years (Aug. 2, 2002
["Three Strikes"]) registered 272 responses. Six articles contained supportive statements
about Three Strikes, representing 2.21 percent of the sample. Discounting the two articles
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same time we are justified in calling these scholars "radical re-
formers" because, their protestations to the contrary notwith-
standing, they wish to replace the founding regime with the ad-
ministrative state. ' The founding regime was based on the prin-
ciple that the "just powers" of government are derived from the
"consent of the governed." ° The supporters of the administrative
state wish to minimize the role of consent and establish a regime
of experts who are insulated from the democratic process. Among
the intellectual elites, support for the administrative state has
become the prevailing orthodoxy. It is therefore only an apparent
paradox to say that "radical reform" is the orthodoxy.
II. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE "THICKER
THEOLOGY" OF THREE STRIKES
It has become a staple argument among the defenders of the
administrative state that state initiative procedures violate the
Republican Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution.
Initiatives are examples of direct democracy and bypass the delib-
erative process, which is the hallmark of republican government.
The framers, we are told, rejected direct democracy because they
feared "mob rule" and substituted in its stead republican govern-
ment based on the principle of legislative representation. Legisla-
tures are designed to be deliberative institutions-the give and
take of coalition building in legislative bodies prevents the kind of
extreme politics that is characteristic of direct democracy. Had
written by the co-authors of this essay (one-third of the total), a scant four articles make
positive references to Three Strikes. It is little wonder then that Professors Vitiello, Zim-
ring and Kamin are eager to exclude us from the debate. Franklin Zimring, Sam Kamin,
Facts, Fallacies, and California's Three Strikes, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 605, 614 (2002); Vitiello,
supra note 4, at 626.
9. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 615.
10. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776), listed as the first of "The
Organic Laws of the United States of America" in the United States Code. USC,
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776):
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Gov-
erned, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it
is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government,
laying its Foundation on such Principles and organizing its Powers in such Form, as
to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
Id. para 2. On the appearance of the Declaration of Independence in the United States
Code, see RICHARD H. Cox, FOUR PILLARS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES 14-16, 58-71 (1998).
Vol. 41176
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Three Strikes been the product of legislative bargaining-which
Zimring seems to equate with "deliberation"--it would have been
less extreme. Legislative deliberation might have produced the
Three Strikes regime that Zimring seems to favor-one "designed
to have maximum symbolic impact while not making major
changes in case outcomes."" The "symbolic impact" of the law
would gratify the anti-offender ire of the public, while at the same
time reserving the actual "case outcomes" to penologists and
judges. According to Zimring, the California law contrasts sharply
with Three Strikes laws in other States and "federal proposals" for
Three Strikes. The strategy of "loud bark, small bite" would pro-
vide enough symbolism for politicians to appear tough on crime
while at the same time allowing experts animated by "an ideology
of rehabilitation"" to soften the punitive aspects of the law. Zim-
ring complains that the Three Strikes regime in California com-
bines a loud bark with a large bite. As experts, Zimring and
Vitiello feel betrayed by this elevation of substance over symbol. 3
The elevation of symbol over substance might possibly provide
the "thicker theology"" necessary to transform the Three Strikes
regime into one informed by the "ideology of rehabilitation." A
"thicker theology" is required by justice and fairness. Zimring, no
less than Vitiello, expressed a belief that Three Strikes carries
penalties that violate Kantian principles because they are dispro-
portionate to the crimes. This is principally due to the fact that
any felony can constitute a third strike-including misdemeanors
elevated to felonies because of prior convictions. This dispropor-
tionality carries costs for the community that are "not insubstan-
tial." Citing a work that Zimring and Hawkins had published
some years ago, Zimring warns that a punishment should not ex-
ceed "that required to express collective feelings of outrage.""
The authors also cite Jeremy Bentham-"who has often been
accused of crude utilitarianism"-in support of the "ideology of
rehabilitation." Bentham wrote that
11. ZIMRING, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 1 at 27; see 168, 227-28.
12. Id. at 213.
13. Id. at 28; see 168; 169 ("loud bark, small bite" has "succeeded brilliantly" in the
"federal proposal."); 176; 195-96; 197 ("A penal system that barks louder than it bites may
in fact be more efficient than one that attempts to average symbolic and instrumental con-
cerns into a single punishment value."); 227-28 ("what we call the loose connection between
symbolic and operational content is an inherent feature of the democratic politics of crimi-
nal justice.").
14. Id. at 213.
15. Id. at 191-92.
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[i]t ought not be forgotten, although it has been too frequently
forgotten, that the delinquent is a member of the community,
as well as any other individual ... and that there is just as
much reason for consulting his interest as that of any other.
His welfare is proportionately the welfare of the community-
his suffering the suffering of the community. 6
Two more unfortunate sources could not have been picked in the
search for a "thicker theology." Apart from the fact that Kant and
Bentham take opposing views on the issue of punishment, the
framers of the American Constitution rejected the view of citizen-
ship and punishment represented by both philosophers. 7
Kant wrote that "punishment is a categorical imperative, and
woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a the-
ory of happiness looking for some advantage to be gained by re-
leasing the criminal from punishment or by reducing the amount
of it."" Indeed, "U]udicial punishment can never be used merely
as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or
for civil society, but instead it must in all cases be imposed on him
only on the ground that he has committed a crime.""9 Thus, Kant
believed that punishment is intrinsic to the crime itself; punish-
ment is an end in itself.
Bentham, on the other hand, did not argue that there was any-
thing inherently good about punishment. For Bentham, morality
did not emanate from the categorical imperative but from a utili-
tarian calculus of pain and pleasure. "All punishment," Bentham
wrote, "in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at
all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it
promises to exclude some greater evil."2" "The business of gov-
ernment," Bentham argues, "is to promote the happiness of the
society, by punishing and rewarding." What is more important for
our purposes, however, is that Bentham famously rejected social
contract as the ground of citizenship and the moral obligations of
16. ZIMRING, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 1 at 192.
17. See RONALD J. PESTRTTO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAW: PUNISHMENT AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA 68-75, 85-89 (2000).
18. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 100 (John Ladd, trans.)
(1965) [originally published in 1797].
19. Id.
20. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRICIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 170 (1970) [origi-
nally published in 1789].
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citizens. For Bentham, the principle of utility was sufficient to
establish obligations.2
The framers of the American Constitution, on the other hand,
grounded citizenship and its attendant obligations in social con-
tract. One commentator has recently argued that "[t]he idea of
compact is at the heart of American constitutionalism. It is at the
heart of the philosophical statesmanship that made the Revolu-
tion, of which the Constitution is the fruit."2 Social contract
meant that obligations were derived from the consent of the gov-
erned and were thus freely incurred. Obligations were simply the
mutual recognition of the rights of other citizens or, one might
say, a mutual recognition of the human dignity of fellow citizens.
From the point of view of the theory of social contract, every crime
is a failure to perform the freely-incurred obligations that proceed
from the mutual recognition of this humanity. Thus, it can be ar-
gued that obligations are not, as Bentham would have it, imposed
by government and enforced by a calculus of rewards and punish-
ments, but freely incurred and grounded in social compact. It was
the theory of social contract that provided the basis for citizenship
in the American Constitution.23
Rehabilitation has an important role to play in punishment-
those willing and able to reacquire their capacity for recognizing
the humanity of others should be given a chance to reenter civil
society. But those who by their repeated acts have demonstrated
an unwillingness or incapacity to do so should be treated severely
because their crimes undermine the basis of civil society itself.
Crime, as Kant argued, is the solvent of civil society because every
crime is an act of individual will, and, to that extent, dissolves the
social contract and reinstates the state of nature. It is the social
compact that replaces the individual will of the state of nature
with the rule of law. Three Strikes targets recidivists, those who
have been given the opportunity to resume their place in the
scheme of reciprocal obligations that characterizes the social com-
pact, but have either failed or refused to do so.
21. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 149-156 (1948) [originally pub-
lished in 1776].
22. HARRY V. JAFFA, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE COMING
OF THE CIVIL WAR 37 (2000).
23. See Edward J. Erler, From Subjects to Citizens: The Social Compact Origins of
American Citizenship, to be published in THOMAS G. WEST AND RONALD J. PESTRITTO, EDS.,
THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND THE SOCIAL COMPACT (2003).
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The criticism of Zimring that Three Strikes targets an older
criminal cohort and therefore is not an effective deterrent is ut-
terly beside the point. 4 This is a wholly utilitarian argument.
The question should not be one of deterrence, but (to use Kant's
language) one of punishment and justice. Deterrence theory ac-
cepts a certain level of crime. Three Strikes, on the other hand,
focuses on just punishment and looks forward, in the words of one
of its principal architects, to a regime of "zero tolerance for
crime." 5 This is how we perceive the "thicker theology" of Three
Strikes.
III. MOB RULE AND THE REPUBLICAN GUARANTEE CLAUSE
Three Strikes is proof to Vitiello and Zimring that the people as
a whole are incapable of deliberation. While they may be compe-
tent to judge the deliberation of legislators, the people do not have
the deliberative capacity to craft legislation themselves. One
commentator has noted that "[t]he Framers of our Constitution,
the theory goes, rejected direct democracy in favor of a representa-
tive-republican-government. A considerable amount of histori-
cal literature supports this theory, much of it focusing on the dis-
trust that Madison and others had of factions and popular preju-
dices."26 The Federal courts have always ruled that questions un-
der the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable because they present
essentially political questions.27
The Constitution, of course, does not define what constitutes a
"Republican Form of Government." James Madison had argued in
The Federalist that only the republican form of government was
"reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the
fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable
determination which animates every votary of freedom to rest all
24. ZIMRING, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY, supra note I at 56.
25. Bill Jones, Three Strikes and You're Out, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 243, 245 (1995).
See Bill Jones, Symposium: Why the Three Strikes Law is Working in California, 11 STAN.
L. & POLY REV. 23 (1999).
26. Ernest L. Graves, The Guarantee Clause in California: State Constitutional Limits
on Initiatives Changing the California Constitution, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1305 (1998).
27. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1911). Justice Hans
Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court is an enthusiastic supporter of state enforcement of the
federal Guarantee Clause, but his advocacy has so far failed to produce results. Hans A.
Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign
Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 39-40 (1993). See Edward J. Erler, Californians and
Their Constitution: Progressivism, Direct Democracy and the Administrative State, 6 NEXUS
240, 243-44 (2001).
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our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-
government."2' The central reference--"the fundamental princi-
ples of the Revolution"-clearly points to the Declaration of Inde-
pendence as an authoritative statement of those principles that
must animate the republican form of government. The main ar-
gument of the Declaration is that governments derive "their just
powers from the consent of the governed." Consent is a principle
of natural right because it is said to be an irrefragable conclusion
from "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God."29 Consent is re-
quired not only for the establishment of government but for its
operation as well. It is, as Lincoln famously stated, "government
of the people, by the people, for the people."" Eliminating the ne-
cessity for that republican government to be "by the people,"
would result in the conclusion that the people need not participate
in their own governance; they can safely entrust their welfare to
the bodies of the administrative state who will pursue the common
good in a way that self-absorbed and interested majorities cannot.
This conclusion obviously flies in the face of the principles of the
founding.
One of the basic fallacies upon which much of the opposition's
argument rests is that legislative decisions are necessarily a prod-
uct of deliberation. As two leading scholars recently noted,
"[l]egislation drafted in representative bodies is, in fact, routinely
drafted by special-interest groups and their lobbyists, not neces-
sarily with an eye for the welfare of the general public."3 A lead-
ing California political observer noted, "In practice, committees in
the California Legislature and other bodies rarely function as pre-
cisely or as effectively as law-makers claim . . . Purely political
factors-special interest campaign contributions, directions from
legislative leaders and vote trading-are often more influential
than logic or even ideology."' It would be as foolish to suggest that
all legislative action embodies deliberation as it would be to sug-
gest that all initiatives are devoid of deliberation. Deliberation
should be judged by the result, not the process.
28. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 240 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
29. See Edward J. Erler, Natural Right in the American Founding, 23 INTERPRETATION
458-462 (1996).
30. 7 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 23 (1953) (emphasis added); HARRY V.
JAFFA, How To THINK ABOUT THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 110-112 (1978).
31. Craig B. Holman and Robert Stern, Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The
Changing Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1239, 1248 (1998).
32. Dan Walters, Committee System No Longer Relevant," INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULL.,
Aug. 29, 2002, at A14.
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IV. REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND
REVOLUTION
The issue of government "by the people" was addressed by
Madison in The Federalist in discussing whether the Constitu-
tional Convention had exceeded its authority in writing an en-
tirely new constitution instead of merely revising the Articles of
Confederation.33 The Convention had been charged by Congress to
revise the Articles and make them "adequate to the exigencies of
the Union." 4 Madison argued that the charge was inconsistent-
no amount of revision could make the Articles "adequate." Thus,
The Federalist concluded, "there is an absolute necessity for an
entire change in the first principles of the system."35
Madison argued that making the Union adequate to meet the
exigencies facing it was far more important than the injunction
that all changes must be merely revisions of the Articles of Con-
federation. Thus, adhering to the form of the Articles would sim-
ply be sacrificing substance to form. And, as Madison subtly
noted, "in all great changes of established governments forms
ought to give way to substance."36 The rigid adherence to forms
"would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and pre-
cious right of the people to 'abolish or alter their governments as
to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happi-
ness."'' 7 And in case any reader failed to recognize the quotation,
Madison supplied a reference to the Declaration of Independence.
It is not an exact quotation, of course, but it does render the sum
and substance of the Declaration's doctrine of the right of revolu-
tion understood as a necessary conclusion from the fact that the
"just powers" of government are derived from the "consent of the
governed." Madison's argument here is a straightforward and
bold assertion of the right of revolution. If the Convention had in
fact violated its instructions to adhere to the form of the Articles of
Confederation, approval by the people will "blot out antecedent
errors and irregularities"' for the simple reason that "THE
CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE". . . is the "pure, original fountain of all
legitimate authority."39
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 40 (Madison).
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 247 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961)..
35. Id. No. 23, at 154 (Hamilton).
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 40 (Madison).
37. Id.
38. Id. No. 40 at 253 (Madison).
39. Id. No. 22, at 153 (Hamilton) (emphasis in original); see No. 49, at 313 (Madison).
182 Vol. 41
Three Strikes: Symbol and Substance
The same reasoning would support the Convention's decision to
bypass the Congress and the state legislatures in the ratification
process. The Articles of Confederation required unanimous con-
sent of all the states for any substantial changes or amendments
to the Articles. The Convention believed that greater legitimacy-
and a greater prospect of change-would be derived from ratifica-
tion by the people than by the states. Thus, the right of revolu-
tion-the ultimate resort of the people-is the right that guaran-
tees every other right and is the ultimate ground of the "Safety
and Happiness" of the people.
It is true that the Framers argued that the resort to revolution
should be only "for certain great and extraordinary occasions."'
The Declaration of Independence cautions that "Prudence, indeed,
will dictate that Governments long established should not be
changed for light and transient Causes; and accordingly all Ex-
perience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suffer,
while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing
the Forms to which they are accustomed."' Jefferson nevertheless
argued that the threat of revolution should be an ordinary ingre-
dient-indeed perhaps the moving principle--of electoral politics.
As Professor Harry Jaffa has recently noted, Jefferson in his first
inaugural address saw
the right of free election as the normal and peaceable fruit of
the right of revolution. But by Jefferson's theory, the right of
revolution would forever underlie the right of free election
and would supply a compelling reason why governments
ought to have such elections as authentic expressions, not
only the people's will, but also of those rights that are the au-
thority for the people's will.
42
Elections might then be regarded as in some sense substitutes
for revolution-repeated renewals of the people's consent as the
foundation of the "just powers" of government. But republican
40. Id. No. 49, at 313 (Madison).
41. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para.2 (U.S. 1776).
42. Supra note 37, at 8; see 280, 416. In 1787 Jefferson wrote that
I am persuaded that the good sense of the people will always be found to be the best
army. They may be led astray for a moment, but will soon correct themselves. The
people are the only censors of their governors: and even their errors will tend to keep
these to the true principles of the institution. To punish these errors too severely
would be to suppress the only safeguard of the public liberty.




government, we are told, excludes any form of direct democracy.
Its core is legislative deliberation-the people are incapable of de-
liberation in mass. Indeed, it has been argued by a prominent
supporter of the administrative state that "[t]he Declaration of
Independence demanded government by the consent of the gov-
erned, not by the governed." 3
In The Federalist, Madison defined republican government as "a
government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from
the great body of the people, and is administered by persons hold-
ing their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or during
good behavior." 4 "It is essential," Madison continues, that "such a
government.., be derived from the great body of the society, not
from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it." 4 Madi-
son's principal concern in recommending a republic over "pure
democracy" was not, as Vitiello insists, because he feared "mob
rule." Mob rule would be excluded by the forms of constitutional
government itself. Rather, Madison's concern was the problem of
"majority faction." Majority faction, unlike "mob rule," could de-
stroy republican government by using the forms of the Constitu-
tion itself as an instrument of its force and violence. In other
words, majority faction simply used the forms of republican gov-
ernment-majority rule-to destroy the ends of republican gov-
ernment, the security of the rights of every individual. The solu-
tion to the problem of majority faction was "constitutional majori-
ties" as opposed merely to "numerical majorities." Constitutional
majorities would rule in a manner that was consistent with the
public good and the rights of minorities because such majorities
were not actuated by a sense of their own interest as a majority.
Indeed, the majority would be composed of a multiplicity of differ-
ent interests that would "render an unjust combination of a major-
ity of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable."' The ob-
ject of Madison's constitutional jurisprudence was "It]o secure the
public good and private rights against the danger of [majority]
43. Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government": The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 23 (1993). See Edward J. Erler, Cali-
fornians and their Constitution: Progressivism, Direct Democracy and the Administrative
State, 6 NEXIS 240, 243-44 (2001).
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (Madison).
45. Id. (emphasis original).
46. Id., No. 51, at 324 (Madison).
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faction," while "at the same time" preserving "the spirit and form
of popular government." 7
Madison compared republican government, not with direct de-
mocracy, but with "pure democracy." Pure democracy is "a society
consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and admin-
ister the government in person."48 Pure democracies thus "can
admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction" because a "common
passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority
of the whole ... and there is nothing to check the inducements to
sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual."49 Pure de-
mocracies, because of their small size and resulting lack of diver-
sity, are prone to majority faction. Republics, on the other hand,
can encompass a larger territory and embrace a greater diversity.
A "scheme of representation" distinguishes a republic from a pure
democracy. Without representation popular government could not
attain the requisite size and diversity. It is true that representa-
tion will have the additional benefit of refining and enlarging the
public view "through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may discern the true interest of their country and
whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice
it to temporary or partial considerations."" Indeed, Madison ar-
gues, "it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the
representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public
good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for
the purpose." Madison is quick to caution, however, that "the ef-
fect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices,
or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other
means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of
the people."5 The scheme of representation is thus truly a "great
mechanical device" that can be used for well or ill. It is most
likely, however, to be used for salutary purposes in extensive and
diverse republics where the competition between factions or inter-
ests will most likely produce moderate majorities. Thus, it is clear
that Madison regarded representation as a necessary but not a
sufficient condition of republican government.
In one of the most cited passages of The Federalist, Madison
wrote that "a dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 82.
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control on the government; but experience has taught mankind
the necessity of auxiliary precautions."52 Representative govern-
ment is not enough. The "auxiliary precautions" afforded by the
separation of powers and checks and balances are necessary not
only for non-tyrannical government, but for good government as
well. The people in mass cannot deliberate. The people are, how-
ever, perfectly competent to judge the deliberation of elected rep-
resentatives. One need not be an expert to judge the putative ex-
pertise of others-the one who wears the shoe is a better judge of
the shoe than the shoemaker. And, frequent elections are the
means by which the people judge. What makes the people safe
judges of government is the fact that the extended republic, with
its multiplicity of competing interests, renders them capable of
self-government. If there is not enough virtue-both moral and
intellectual-in the people, as both Vitiello and Zimring suggest,
then republican government in any form is impossible. Whether
the best alternative is the administrative state or some other form
of non-republican government we leave to another occasion.
V. REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT MUST BE LIMITED GOVERNMENT
The framers believed that the principled foundations of republi-
can government, as outlined in the Declaration of Independence,
required limited government. By the theory of the Declaration,
government was limited to securing the conditions necessary to
the exercise of rights and liberties. When the people establish
government they delegate certain powers to government to be ex-
ercised for their benefit. The powers not delegated by the people
are retained by the people. On this view, sovereignty resides in
the people, not the government, and the just or legitimate powers
of government can only be delegated by the people. This view of
the sovereignty of the people was, of course, an innovation-
indeed revolutionary. Madison had noted that "rights... are re-
served by the manner which the federal powers are delegated." 3
Residual sovereignty always remains with the people. The powers
not delegated to the federal government and not forbidden by the
Constitution to the states belong to the states or to the people.54
52. Id., No. 51, at 322 (Madison).
53. Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1787, in WILLIAM T. HUTCHINSON, ET AL., THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 11: 297 (1977).
54. U.S. CONST, amend. X.
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The people in the various states have delegated power in a vari-
ety of ways. Article VI of the Constitution makes the federal Con-
stitution the supreme law of the land and in the exercise of its
delegated powers the federal government must prevail over the
states in cases of conflict. But in the exercise of its policy powers,
the states are sovereign-limited, of course, by the federal Bill of
Rights and the requirement that the states must have a republi-
can form of government.
Can the people in the states, in the exercise of their sovereign
powers, retain some legislative powers in the form of initiatives
without violating the Republican Guarantee Clause? Madison
cited two provisions as "proof' of the "republican complexion" of
the Constitution. The first, which Madison calls "the most deci-
sive," is the "absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under
the federal and the State governments."55  The second provision
that Madison offered as "proof' of the republican character of the
Constitution was "its express guaranty of the republican form" to
state governments.56 In his final word on the Guarantee Clause,
Madison notes that it will allow the federal government "to defend
the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations."57 In
this sense, the Guarantee Clause, as Madison indicated, is the
counterpart to the prohibition on titles of nobility. In sum, the
Guarantee Clause, according to Madison, is a "restriction im-
posed" on the states "that they shall not exchange republican for
anti-republican Constitutions."" The leading authority on the
Guarantee Clause, William Wiecek, drew the irresistible conclu-
sion: The Guarantee Clause "was designed to prohibit monarchical
or aristocratic institutions in the states."" Indeed, Wiecek con-
cluded that the Guarantee Clause was intended to insure "that
state governments would remain responsive to popular will."'
It is true that Madison expected majority factions to be more
likely at the state level simply because the States lacked the req-
uisite size and diversity. Indeed, it was Madison's view that the
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 242 (Madison). Hamilton, in a later paper, remarks
that this prohibition "may truly be denominated the cornerstone of republican government;
for so long as [titles of nobility] are excluded there can never be serious danger that the
government will be any other than that of the people." Id., No. 84, at 512 (Hamilton).
56. Id., No. 39, at 242 (Madison).
57. Id., No. 43, at 274 (Madison).
58. Id. at 275.
59. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 62 (1972).
60. Id. at 63.
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states under the Articles were dominated by such majorities and
that state legislatures had become merely the instruments of ma-
jority faction. Madison argued that the extended republic, with its
greater diversity, coupled with the institutional constraints im-
posed by separation of powers and checks and balances, would
produce a government that was responsive only to the "cool and
deliberate sense of the community."' The separation of powers
was designed to insure that "the reason alone, of the public" would
inform the deliberations of the different branches of government.62
The public good is the object of deliberation and the separation of
powers was intended to render those who occupy constitutional
offices, by pitting "ambition against ambition," to pursue that end.
Contrary to Professor Vitiello, the purpose of the separation of
powers was not to create cadres of experts." It would make little
or no sense to pit the ambition of experts against the ambition of
experts as a vehicle for "supplying . . . the defect of better mo-
tives."6 The "better motives" of experts is guaranteed simply by
the fact of their expertise. Rather, the framers understood consti-
tutional government in its full political sense, not the narrow and
truncated sense of administration or expertise-the vision that
inspires Zimring and Vitiello.
California has more than ten times the population the United
States had in 1790, and the population represents a greater diver-
sity of interests as well. It is hardly credible that such a diverse
population could produce majority factions-the very thing that
critics of "direct democracy" say is a regular feature of the initia-
tive process. Indeed, as the case of Three Strikes illustrates, it is
much more likely that the legislature will be paralyzed by interest
group brokering and special interest pleading. Genuine delibera-
tion becomes impossible when the voice of the public good is
drowned by the cacophony of special interests clamoring for as-
cendancy in the legislature. When legislatures are incapable of
acting in the public interest, the people must have some resort
that falls short of revolution. This was the role originally assigned
to the initiative but which today is viewed by some as the antithe-
sis of progress. Indeed, these proponents of the administrative
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 384 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
62. Id., No. 49, at 317 (Madison).
63. Vitiello, supra note 4, 623-24.
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (Madison).
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state are driven to argue that direct involvement by the people-
even for republican ends-is inherently anti-republican.
In the oft-quoted case of Kadderly v. Portland (1903), the Ore-
gon Supreme Court ruled that the initiative and referendum
amendment at issue in the case did "not abolish or destroy the
republican form of government, or substitute another in its place.
The representative character of the government still remains. The
people have simply reserved to themselves a larger share of legis-
lative power .... The initiative and referendum are thus legisla-
tive powers reserved to the people. The Kadderly decision pointed
out that state initiatives exist within the context of-and are lim-
ited by-state constitutions. Statutory and Constitutional initia-
tives must conform to the state constitution as well as the federal
constitution. In California, most initiatives fail to meet constitu-
tional standards and are held unconstitutional by the courts. The
simple reservation of a portion of legislative power to the people
can hardly be called a violation of the Republican Guarantee
Clause. Initiatives are a direct reminder of the fact that in repub-
lican government the people are the sole source of legitimate
power. To argue that the limited exercise of direct democracy vio-
lates the Republican Guarantee Clause is simply to elevate form
over substance.
It is certainly true that initiatives are often poorly written, de-
ceptive and of dubious constitutionality. By the same token, how-
ever, we believe that some of the important initiatives in Califor-
nia's recent history-most notably the Three Strikes initiative and
the California Civil Rights Initiative-have served the public in-
terest in a way that the legislature was unable or unwilling to do.
Whether or not the public interest has been served should be de-
termined by substance, not form. Most initiatives are rejected by
the voters-even a significant majority of constitutional amend-
ment initiatives placed on the ballot by the legislature are re-
jected. The people of California seem quite willing to defer to the
"deliberative process" when they have evidence that deliberation
has actually taken place. But it would strain credulity to main-
tain that the "deliberative process" always results in genuine de-
liberation or deliberation animated by a sense of the public good.
Whenever California voters are uncertain or confused they tend to
65. Kadderly v. Portland, 74 P. 710, 719 (Or. 1903).
Fall 2002 189
Duquesne Law Review
indulge a healthy skepticism.66 And although, as Zimring noted,
initiatives can only be voted up or down and that once proposed no
compromise is possible, to say that the "all or nothing" character-
istic of the vote excludes the possibility of deliberation is to con-
fuse "deliberation" with interest group brokering.
VI. DELIBERATION AND "PUBLIC PANIC"
Zimring and Vitiello describe the process whereby Three Strikes
came into law as "unusual."7 The normal legislative process was
bypassed in favor of "populist preemeption" that displaced the in-
fluence of experts. 8 Aggrieved father Mike Reynolds and Assem-
blyman Bill Jones crafted the Three Strikes proposal and simulta-
neously submitted it as a ballot initiative and legislative bill.
Both efforts were met with initial difficulty. The Public Safety
Committee in the Assembly refused to approve the bill and, de-
spite an immediate burst of support, the initiative petition process
became bogged down. The brutal murder and kidnapping of Polly
Klaas changed the scenario. It was this tragedy, according to
Vitiello and Zimring that stampeded the public into acceptance of
an irrational policy that was animated solely by anti-offender ire.
But clearly the public had come to realize that the regime of ex-
perts was failing dismally in the area of crime. Poly Klaas' killer
was a career criminal who would still have been in prison had the
Three Strikes regime been in place. He was on parole because a
parole panel had certified him as no longer a danger to society.
Polly Klaas' brutal murder was only the proximate cause of the
public's overwhelming support for Three Strikes. Tired of being
victimized by career criminals, public support was overwhelming
and almost unprecedented when Governor Wilson signed the
Three Strikes bill on March 7, 1994.
Zimring and Vitiello marvel at the lack of involvement by As-
sembly Speaker Willie Brown in the face of such "populist preemp-
tion." They describe the powerful Speaker as passive in the face of
an "outside the beltway" onslaught from marginal pressure
66. Holman & Stern, supra note 31, at 1249. Voters tend to be very cautious and thus
are reluctant to approve initiatives at the ballot box. Historically, California's initiatives
average a one-third approval rate. This reluctance dramatically increases when voters are
uncertain about a measure. When uncertain, the voter generally casts a vote against an
initiative in order to maintain the existing public order. Id.
67. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 618; ZIMRING, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 1,
at 3.
68. ZIMRING, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 3.
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groups.69 However, the account offered by Zimring and Vitiello is
somewhat superficial. It does not take into account the influence
of Assembly leadership on the committee process. Brown, through
Public Safety Committee members John Burton, Tom Bates, and
Barbara Lee, exercised considerable influence in bottling up the
initial bill. If there was no support for the measure on the floor,
then why not let the bill come up for a vote? The actions of Brown
and his allies on the Public Safety Committee implied that the bill
would receive significant floor support and would likely pass.
Brown exercised legislative discretion and prevented the initial
attempt to pass the bill. A full and fair debate might very well
have led to its passage much earlier-and perhaps in a different
form. This account is wholly at odds with that offered by Zimring
and Vitiello.
There was nothing unusual about the passage of Three Strikes
as Zimring and Vitiello would have us believe. The legislative
elite opposed the bill. They had prevented earlier versions of it
from passing until public demand proved overwhelming. The fact
that a proposed initiative was the immediate cause does not make
the Three Strikes process unusual. When legislators sense that
the public overwhelmingly supports a measure they do not always
enact it. However, when legislators sense that the public is aware
of the fact that a cadre of legislative elites has consistently de-
railed popular proposals, they almost always change course and
adopt the new measure."0 This is true even at the federal level,
where there are no direct democracy provisions. And it is also
true in California. Support for the initiative was an indicator of
constituent sentiment. A rational respect for the wishes of one's
constituents is the more formal cause of legislative deliberation.
Such respect is not unusual in a free government-it is the hall-
mark of free government.
VII. A COMEDY OF ERRORS
Much of our effort in this essay has been devoted to what Zim-
ring, Kamin, and Vitello identify as their primary argument: our
misunderstanding of the role of expertise in America's republican
regime. However, before concluding we would like to take the op-
portunity to address the responses by Zimring and Kamin to our
69. Id. at 5. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 617.
70. For a detailed discussion of "salience effects" on legislative behavior, see JOHN
KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (1989).
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critique of their methodology. As stated in the notes to the intro-
duction, our critique was focused on: 1) the timing of the samples;
2) the claim of no incapacitation effect; 3) the conflation of arrests
and crime; 4) the lack of statewide data; and 5) the claim of no de-
terrent effect.
With respect to our critique of the timing of their samples, Zim-
ring and Kamin argue that
the literature on deterrence suggests that because publicity
and public concern are generally at their maximum around
the time of legal change, the closer the observation to the
change, the greater the chance that the effect of the legal
change will be detected .... Thus, the timing of our two large
samples was not only orthodox by the standards of deterrence
research, but in fact demanded by convention.7
However, the "literature" cited by Zimring and Kamin consists
of two articles, one on the 1967 British Road Safety Act by H.
Laurence Ross and another on drug laws co-authored by Kamin.
One would think that "convention" would require a greater show-
ing than two articles. In addition, the British Road Safety study is
inapplicable because it tried to determine the effect of a law that
criminalized certain behavior for the first time; whereas Three
Strikes was designed to enhance penalties for existing crimes.
Thus, the British study is wholly irrelevant to any Three Strikes
analysis.
The image conjured up by Zimring is scarcely credible: felons in-
tensely following legislative debate and calculating with uncanny
precision, not only the results of the debate, but its likely adverse
effect upon them.72 Vitiello seems to offer an entirely different ex-
perience. He recounts some conversations he had with "a number
of intelligent people at different times since the passage of Three
Strikes."73 Vitiello reports that "the respondents are almost uni-
versally shocked" at the reach and extent of the Three Strikes re-
gime.74 "Their confusion," he laments, "is understandable."75 One
is left to ponder how "intelligent people" can be so utterly confused
when the ordinary criminal in Zimring's universe understands
71. Zimring & Kamin, supra, note 3, at 609-610.
72. C. W. Kohfeld, Rational Cops, Rational Robbers, and Information, 11 J. CRIM. JUST.
459(1983).
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with prescient lucidity? Either Vitiello's interlocutors are not as
intelligent as he believes or the criminals described by Zimring are
far more intelligent than ordinary experience would lead us to be-
lieve. In any case, the two Professors present something of a co-
nundrum: the mass of the voters were simply irrational in their
demand for Three Strikes, but criminals were able to calculate
with Euclidian precision the future effects of the new law even
before its passage. Since Zimring and Vitiello maintain that the
Three Strikes law is wholly irrational, how is it possible to calcu-
late its logical effects?
There are many reputable studies that test for lag effects on
public policy innovations that were ignored by Zimring. Testing
for lag effects is standard methodology in policy studies.76 It is
Zimring who appears to be unaware of the literature on research
design.
In responding to our claim that some of the April 1994 arrests
could have come from crimes committed before March 7, 1994,
Zimring and Kamin cite a small body of literature to bolster their
argument that, for most crimes, arrests occur close in time to the
offense. While we may be inclined to accept this on its face, we
find it strange that Zimring and Kamin chose to cite outside
sources rather than their own data set. Our criticism could have
been easily dismissed by a recounting of the relevant information
from their own data. Why not simply check the arrest records
76. James A. Fox, Crime Trends and Police Expenditures: An Investigation of the Lag
Structure, 3 EVALUATION Q. 41-58 (1979); Henry N. Pontell, Deterrence: Theory Versus
Practice, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1978); Scott H. Decker and Carol W. Kohfeld, The Deterrent
Effect of Capital Punishment in the Five Most Active Execution States: A Time Series
Analysis, 15 CRIM. JUST. REV. 173 (1990); Donald F. Green, Measures in Illegal Behavior in
Individual-level Deterrence Research, 26 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQ. 253 (1989); Edward
L. Wells, Self-Enhancement Through Delinquency: A Conditional Test of Self-Derogation
Theory, 26 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQ. 226 (1989); Raymond Paternoster, Examining
Three-Wave Deterrence Models: A Question of Temporal Order and Specification, 79 J.
CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 135 (1988); Kirk. R. Williams and Richard Hawkins. Perceptual
Research on General Deterrence: A Critical Review, 20 LAw & SOCY 545 (1986); Scott H.
Decker and Carol W. Kohfeld, A Deterrence Study of the Death Penalty in Illinois, 1933-
1980 12, J. CRIM. JUST. 367 (1984); William C. Bailey, Murder and Capital Punishment in
the Nation's Capital, 1 JUST. Q. 211 (1984); C. W. Kohfeld, Rational Cops, Rational Robbers,
and Information, J. CRIM. JUST.459 (1983); Yih Wu Liu, Modeling Criminal Activity in an
Area of Economic Decline, 42 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 385 (1983); William W. Minor and Harry
Joseph, Deterrent and Experiential Effects in Perceptual Research: A Replication and Exten-
sion 19 J. RES. CRIM. & DELINQ. 190 (1982); Lee H. Bowker, Crime and the Use of Prisons in
the United States: A Time Series Analysis 27 CRIM. & DELINQ. 206 (1981); Terrence E.
Jones, The Impact of Crime Rate Changes on Police Protection Expenditures in American
Cities, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 516 (1974); Leroy C. Gould, The Changing Structure of Property
Crime in an Affluent Society, 48 SOC. FORCES 50 (1969).
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they collected and answer our rather straightforward question
from the information they claim to possess?
With respect to our point about the limitations of the incapaci-
tation effect prior to 1997, Zimring and Kamin argue that they did
in fact address this issue. They claim to have accomplished this
by demonstrating that the rate of increase in total incarcerations
did not radically change after Three Strikes.77 The logic here is
that since there was no real change in the number of sentences
there could be no incapacitation effect resulting from the new law.
Once again, this fails to address the point made by Professors
Beres and Griffith that any attempt to examine incapacitation
before 1997 is pointless.v8 As stated above, most of the felons con-
victed under Three Strikes would still have received sentences
under the old system that would have kept them in prison until
1997 or beyond. Therefore, we concur with Beres and Griffith that
any meaningful test of incapacitation must take place after 1997.
Zimring and Kamin steadfastly refuse to examine or address this
crucial point.
Zimring and Kamin also take issue with our criticism that they
have conflated arrests and crime, thus skewing the results toward
a null finding. We argued that there may be different arrest rates
for different crimes and that this disparity might render any in-
terpretation of crime from arrest data unreliable. Zimring and
Kamin respond by arguing that:
[I]f the odds of being caught were twice as high for third
strike eligible defendants than for those without any strikes
on their record, their 3.3 percent share of all arrests in April
of 1993 would be evidence that they committed only 1.7 per-
cent of California crime during that period. . . . this would
strengthen the case against Three Strikes as a major crime
prevention tool.79
However, this response betrays a fundamental difference that
we have with Zimring and Kamin. They argue that because a
category of criminals is only 3.3 or, for the sake of argument, even
1.7 percent of the population, somehow these criminals are not
77. ZIMRING, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 91-94.
78. Linda Beres and Thomas Griffeth, Did 'Three Strikes" Cause the Recent Drop in
California Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney General's Report, 32 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 101, 117 (1998).
79. Zimring & Kamin, supra note 3, at 608.
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worthy of serious public concern. Consider the following. What if
there were only two types of criminals: jaywalkers and serial kill-
ers. What if serial killers were only 0.5 percent of all criminals.
Would a reasonable person suggest that serial killing is not a seri-
ous problem because it only comprises 0.5 percent of all crime?
There is a more fundamental methodological problem, however,
with the conflation of arrests and crime. Zimring lumped the
three cities together, ignoring the fact that each of the cities is
likely to have a different arrest to crime ratio."s An arrest in one
city may not prove to be a proxy of the same weight in another
city. During the time period in which Zimring conducted his
study, the arrests to crime ratio was rising because, while the
number of arrests was stable, the crime rate, as even Zimring
noted, was declining significantly. According to data provided by
the California Department of Justice, the arrests to crime ratio
increased in San Francisco County, Los Angeles County, and San
Diego County." Granted, these are county data, but San Fran-
cisco is both a city and a county, while the cities of Los Angeles
and San Diego are the largest entities within their respective
counties and undoubtedly drove the results. The data give reason
to cast suspicion on the conflation of arrests and crime because
clearly the arrests to crime ratio changed significantly while Zim-
ring's model posits no change. And if the connection between ar-
rests and crime is not valid, the remaining conclusions of the Zim-
ring study are similarly tainted. Using correct arrest to crime ra-
tios, it is clear beyond cavil that an arrest in 1994 or 1995 repre-
sents less crime than it did in 1993. Therefore, as we hypothe-
sized, the conflation of arrests and crime further depresses the
measurement of a potential deterrent effect of Three Strikes.
In response to our critique that they did not have a single
statewide datum in a monograph entitled Crime and Punishment
in California, Zimring and Kamin argue that monthly city data
from nine of California's ten largest cities is a better measure be-
cause 84 monthly data periods are superior to seven annual
statewide data points." According to Zimring and Kamin, their
analysis confirms that the downward trend in crime rates that
began in 1991 did not accelerate after Three Strikes went into ef-
80. Roland Chilton, Analyzing Urban Crime Data: Deterrence and the Limitations of
Arrest Per Arrest Ratios, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 590 (1982).
81. California Judicial System Statistical Tables, available at
http://justice.hdcdojnet.state.ca.us/cjsc-stats/prof00/ (last visited 8-14-2002).
82. Zimring & Kamin, supra, note 3, at 611-12.
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fect. However, they offer no statistical test to back up their claim,
not even the rudimentary t-test we offered in our article. We be-
lieve, however, that we proved that a significant acceleration of
the rate of decline occurred after 1994. Are we simply to take
their word for it and be satisfied with their conclusion?83
Finally, we would like to take the opportunity to correct a mis-
taken impression given by Zimring and Kamin in their reply to
our article. They accused us of making "demonstrably false"
statements regarding their positions on prison sentences and the
deterrent effect of the law.' With respect to prison sentences, we
made the point in our original article that Zimring argued that the
"the law had a statistically. meaningless impact on criminal sen-
tences."85 We made this point based upon conclusions derived
from Zimring: "Thus, the principal mechanism for increasing the
punishment of three-strikes-eligible defendants could not have
been the sentencing provisions in the three strikes law."8 6 Fur-
thermore, Zimring discussed the number of prison sentences
meted out before and after the law: "there was no discontinuous
shift in incarceration trends that tracked the change in crime
trends.... The 5.9 percent increase in 1994 is within a tenth of a
percentage point of the median increase for the 1990s.""7 How can
Zimring and Kamin say that our characterization of these two
statements is "demonstrably false?" We will let the quotations
speak for themselves. The clearest example of obfuscation is con-
tained in their argument on deterrence: "A second misstatement
appears in the first paragraph of the article where readers are
told, 'the thesis of the study is that California's Three Strikes law
83. In a related matter, we would like to address the rather crude methodological point
made by Zimring and Kamin in their argument against general deterrence. They assert
that a measurement with 84 data points is inherently superior to one with only seven.
While 84 years would be better than seven years when comparing a trend, the 84 months of
the Zimring study is not presumptively better than the seven years of aggregated statistical
evidence we offered in rebuttal. Zimring and Kamin seem to imply that 84 observations are
better because the higher number solves the small n problem in statistical theory. But this
places the rules of statistical formality ahead of substantive meaning, something we think
is at the heart of their entire argument. Why not collect data on the 2,555 days over the
period in question to ensure that the number of observations is as high as possible? This is
the classic case of maximizing internal validity at the expense of external validity.
84. Zimring & Kamin, supra note 3, at 612.
85. Janiskee & Erler, supra note 2, at 45.
86. ZIMRING, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 52. See
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 73.
87. ZIMRING, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 73. See
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 93.
196 Vol. 41
Three Strikes: Symbol and Substance
has failed to deter crime.' 88 In response to this claim we offer an
extended quote from Zimring:
Before three strikes came into effect, 13.9 percent of adult fel-
ony arrests involved the specially targeted group, compared to
12.8 percent after the new punishments were operative. This
difference is not statistically significant, so it is not prudent to
assume there was any decline in the share of crime committed
by those targeted in the new law... We found no evidence of
spillover deterrence, the 45.4 percent of all felony arrests that
involve previously convicted felons after three strikes is not
significantly different from the 44.8 percent of all arrests in
this category before the law was passed.8 9
We find it disingenuous that Zimring and Kamin would accuse us
of misrepresenting their statements.
In the most sophisticated statistical analysis of Three Strikes to
date, Joanna Shepherd regards the Zimring study with consider-
able skepticism." According to Shepherd, the study is flawed be-
cause it is "based on the raw data before and after enactment of
the law instead of regression analysis."9' Regression analysis con-
trols for other effects on crime besides the particular hypothesized
factor in question. In addition, Shepherd finds the Zimring study
flawed because it assumes "that the only deterrence possible un-
der strike laws is partial deterrence."92 That is, Zimring only fo-
cuses on those specifically targeted by the law. As Shepherd ar-
gues, "[t]his assumption is fundamentally wrong; strike laws may
also deter individuals contemplating their first strike."93 Echoing
our own concerns about Zimring's methodology, Shepherd notes
that a "study that limits the deterrent effect to this group will
necessarily understate the legislation's effectiveness."94 Following
the baseball metaphor of Three Strikes, Shepherd uses the exam-
ple of a batter. A batter is concerned with the first strike because
it puts him closer to the third strike. The same logic might apply
to those considering whether or not to commit a strike-eligible of-
fense: "This may result in early strike offenders substituting out of
88. Zimring and Kamin, supra note 3, at 613.
89. ZIMRING, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 4.
90. Shepherd, supra note 7.






the harshly penalized crimes and into the nonstrikeable crimes
with lesser penalties."95 This would apply to those with no strikes
or one strike on their record. Those with two strikes, given the
realities of California's policy, should be concerned about commit-
ting any felony. Shepherd finds that sentences meted out under
the law have a significant deterrent effect on murder, aggravated
assault, robbery, and burglary: "Fearing initial strikes, potential
criminals commit fewer crimes that qualify as initial strikes."96
VIII. THREE STRIKES AND THE CONSTITUTION REBORN
It is a matter of some curiosity that neither Zimring, Kamin, or
Vitiello challenged our constitutional analysis of Three Strikes.
We devoted significant attention to the Romero case because this
decision seemed to be at the heart of efforts by Vitiello and other
like-minded opponents of Three Strikes to weaken the law. We
did demonstrate, however, that Vitiello had utterly misread the
holding in Romero. Contrary to what Vitiello had implied, the
California Supreme Court did not rule on constitutional separa-
tion of powers grounds-that the power to act in the interest of
justice was inherent in the judiciary-but on statutory grounds.
The Three Strikes legislation had simply not repealed in un-
equivocal terms an earlier law allowing judicial discretion. The
court clearly stated, however, that legislation specifically directed
at repealing the discretion of judges would not offend the separa-
tion of powers requirements of the California Constitution.97
In a footnote, Vitiello complains that we failed to consider
whether Three Strikes could be invalidated under the California
Constitution. We have, Vitiello claims, ignored independent state
grounds and "developed case law interpreting the California Con-
stitution."98 Vitiello relies on several pre-Three Strike cases which
putatively carved out independent state ground interpretations for
the California Constitution's prohibition on "cruel or unusual pun-
ishment." In one case, In re Lynch (1972), the court noted that a
punishment violates the California Constitution "if, although not
cruel or unusual in its method, it is so disproportionate to the
crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and of-
95. Shepherd, supra note 7 at 175.
96. Id. at 190.
97. Erler & Janiskee, supra note 2, at 61-63.
98. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 615.
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fends fundamental notions of human dignity."s" One of the au-
thorities frequently cited in the court's opinion was People v.
Anderson, a decision handed down earlier in the same year. In
Anderson, the court had declared the death penalty unconstitu-
tional on independent state grounds, holding that capital punish-
ment was "unnecessary to any legitimate goal of the state and in-
compatible with the dignity of man and the judicial process."'00
The Anderson decision provoked a storm of protest, ultimately re-
sulting in a constitutional amendment initiative overturning the
decision. The initiative was eventually upheld in People v. Frier-
son (1979), in which the court concluded that "[t]he clear intent of
the electorate . . . was to circumvent Anderson by restoring the
death penalty to the extent permitted by the Federal Constitu-
tion..l01
In 1982, another initiative, the Victims' Bill of Rights, mandated
that the exclusion of evidence in criminal trials proceed on federal
grounds rather than independent state grounds. This initiative
was similarly upheld by the California Supreme Court. In 1990,
the people of California passed another initiative, Proposition 115
(the Crime Victims' Justice Reform Act), withdrawing independ-
ent state ground powers in almost all areas touching upon the
rights of criminal defendants. This wholesale attempt to curtail
the power of California courts did not, however, survive judicial
scrutiny. The California Constitution allows constitutional
amendment by initiative, but constitutional revisions can only be
made by a specially appointed commission. The California Su-
preme Court in Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) declared Proposition
115 unconstitutional as a revision, rather than an amendment, of
the Constitution."' The revision "would substantially alter the
substance and integrity of the state constitution as a document of
independent force and effect." 103 Thus, the initiative "substantially
alters the preexisting constitutional scheme or framework." 4 The
court determined that the piecemeal withdrawal of independent
state grounds survived the constitutional challenge as an amend-
ment; however, any wholesale attempt to do so necessarily
amounted to a revision. Vitiello's characterization that Three
99. In re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 (1972).
100. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 656 (1972).
101. Id. at 185 (emphasis in original).





Strikes could be challenged using "developed case law" is surely a
gross exaggeration. An initiative would be mounted in short order
to withdraw the independent state grounds authority in the area
of Three Strikes and on the basis of well developed case law it
would almost certainly be upheld.
Since our original article was published, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals has declared that some sentences meted out under the
Three Strikes regime are "grossly disproportionate" and therefore
constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. In Andrade v. California (2001), the court
stressed that the issue was not the constitutionality of the Three
Strikes law, but only whether some sentences that result from
"quirks" in the law violate the Eighth Amendment. "At issue
here," the court noted, "is whether [the Eighth] amendment pro-
scribes a sentence of 50 years to life for two shoplifting offenses
involving videotapes worth a total of $153.54 by a defendant with
several previous convictions for non-violent offenses.""5 Andrade
had an extensive criminal history: "five felonies, two misdemean-
ors, and one parole violation." 6 Prosecutors took advantage of
every discretion in Andrade's case: "Because he had a prior theft
offense" his current petty theft charges "were elevated to petty
theft with a prior-a 'wobbler' offense punishable either as a mis-
demeanor or felony . . . The prosecution's decision to charge the
petty thefts as felonies qualified the offenses as his third and
fourth strikes."107 Because of this "unique quirk" in California law,
"Andrade's recidivism was double counted, first enhancing his
misdemeanor offenses to felonies and then enhancing them again
to third and fourth strikes." 8 Since the California law does not
allow for concurrent sentencing, Andrade received two consecutive
25 years to life sentences. And since the minimum Three Strike
sentences cannot be reduced by credit for good behavior, "Andrade
therefore must serve a minimum of 50 years in prison before he is
eligible for parole."10 9 He will be 87 years old when he is first eli-
gible for parole and, given that "[t]he life expectancy of a 37-year-
old American male is 77 years," this sentence "more likely than
not" will mean that "Andrade will spend the remainder of his life
105. Andrade v. California, 270 F.3d 743, 754 (9t' Cir. 2001).
106. Id. at 760.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 758.
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in prison without ever becoming eligible for parole.""' In effect,
Andrade received the equivalent of a life in prison without parole
for a misdemeanor crime-and it is this "quirk" of the California
law that the court found grossly disproportionate.
The court rightly noted that the Supreme Court has been badly
split on the question of the appropriate standards for proportional-
ity review-and even whether proportionality review is required
by the Eighth Amendment. Yet, as the court noted, at one time or
another seven members of the current Supreme Court have agreed
that some form of proportionality review is required and the opin-
ion most often agreed to is Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
in Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), an opinion joined only in part by
Justices O'Connor and Souter."' This "rule of Harmelin," accord-
ing to the Ninth Circuit, adopted Solem factors as the appropriate
standard of review."' Using Solem factors, the court concluded
that the 50 years to life sentence for "two misdemeanor thefts of
nine videotapes, even when we consider his history of non-violent
offenses" was "grossly disproportionate.""'
Judge Joseph Sneed mounted a spirited dissent. He denied that
disproportionate weight should be given to Kennedy's concurring
opinion in Harmelin."4 Furthermore, he argued that the majority
had simply ignored the limited reach of Kennedy's opinion. Ken-
nedy had cautioned that "outside the context of capital punish-
ment," successful challenges would be "exceedingly rare." And in
several places Kennedy averred to the necessity of granting "sub-
110. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 759.
111. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991).
112. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). According to the Court in Solem, the factors
which must be considered as part of a proportionality review are " (i) the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions." Id. at 292.
113. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 767.
114. Some California court of appeals decisions have questioned whether the Ninth
Circuit is correct in regarding Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin as authoritative.
People v. Gholar, No. F037654, 2002 WL 1360315, at *7 (Cal. App., June 20, 2002). ("We
also are sure that Solem, despite Justice Kennedy's attempt at reconciliation, does not
represent the current state of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence"); People v. Anderson,
2002 WL 1722392, at *5, n. 2 (Cal. App. July 25, 2002) (noting that Solem "did not retain
the support of a majority of the court in Harmelin. . . it is clear that a majority of the Su-
preme Court would agree that a sentence is constitutional if it does not appear to be grossly
disproportionate based on an analysis of the gravity of the offense and harshness of the
penalty alone"); People v. Vargas, 2002 WL 1764180, at *3 (Cal. App. July 31, 2002) ("Har-
melin leaves the current state of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence unclear... We are also
confident that Solem, despite Justice Kennedy's attempt at reconciliation, does not repre-
sent the current state of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence").
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stantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess
in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes."115
Judge Sneed reminded the court that "[tihe sentencing scheme in
the instant case was the result of both popular vote (Proposition
184 was approved by 71.84 percent of the electorate) and legisla-
tive action. Our deference should be at its apex.""' Indeed, Sneed
concluded, the holding in Harmelin was "narrow"--a "prohibition
on grossly disproportionate sentences."".7  The reason Kennedy's
opinion must be read narrowly, according to Sneed, was Kennedy's
own warning that the "precise contours" of the "proportionality
principle" are "unclear.""8 Because the principle is "unclear," def-
erence to state legislatures is mandated as is the necessity of rely-
ing on "objective factors" in determining proportionality.
Sneed noted that "i]t has long been the law of this Circuit that
'generally, as long as the sentence imposed on a defendant does
not exceed statutory limits, this court will not overturn it on
Eighth Amendment grounds.' 1.9 As long as there is a rational ba-
sis for legislation, deference should be given to state legislatures.
And such deference "is particularly appropriate with regard to
treatment of recidivist offenders.2 ° In view of Andrade's long his-
tory of recidivism, "it is rational for a sentencing court to deter-
mine that a term of twenty-five years to life is not a grossly dis-
proportionate sentence for each of Appellant's current crimes."'
A subsequent case from the Ninth Circuit, Brown v. Mayle
(2002), used the analysis in Andrade to invalidate a 25 year to life
Three Strikes sentences as "grossly disproportionate" when ap-
plied to "a petty theft offense ... even in light of the criminal re-
cords" of the defendants. The facts of this case were almost
identical to those in Andrade. Defendants were career criminals
115. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 768 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 768-69.
117. Id. at 770.
118. Id. (citing Harmelin v. Mich., 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991)).
119. Id. at 768 (quoting U.S. v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001)).
120. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 771.
121. Id. at 772. In a footnote Sneed argued that the majority mischaracterized the facts
of the case:
It should be emphasized that Andrade's sentence is not one fifty-year sentence for
thefts totaling $153.54. Appellant, in fact, is facing two consecutive twenty-five year
sentences for two separate felony offenses. The Majority's comparison of Andrade's
sentence to other "Three Strikes" defendants misses this point. Appellant's sentence
is 'twice as long' as the sentences of these other defendants because he has committed
twice the number of offenses.
Id. at 772, n. 4.
122. Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).
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who had misdemeanor offenses elevated to felonies because of
their prior records. Both were convicted of third strike offenses
and sentenced to the mandatory 25 years to life. The court con-
cluded that "[i]t bears noting... that the standard we are applying
is one of proportionality-the relationship of the conviction to
crime. If Andrade's 50-year-to-life sentence for two petty theft
convictions was grossly disproportionate, it follows that a 25-year-
to life sentence is grossly disproportionate to one petty theft con-
viction."' 3 But as Judge Sneed pointed out in Andrade, this lan-
guage utterly ignores-or certainly minimizes-the element of
recidivism which was the proximate cause of the harsh sentences.
It also ignores the fact that in Andrade the inference of "gross dis-
proportionality" was initially based on the fact that a 50 years to
life sentence for Andrade amounted to a virtual death sentence.
Both Andrade and Brown underplay the significance of recidi-
vism in the assignment of punishment. Since we are convinced
that a two-strikes law, counting only violent or serious felonies as
strikes, would survive constitutional muster, we wonder why
there is so much emphasis on the character of the third strike in
the California law. The law targets recidivism and does not calcu-
late strikes in isolation from prior criminal history. A California
court of appeal decision noted that the "penological theory" of
Three Strikes is long prison sentences for repeat offenders.' 4 The
Ninth Circuit-along with Zimring and Vitiello-did not like this
theory, but it cannot be repealed by judicial fiat, especially in a
federal republic where, in matters of criminal law, state legisla-
tures are owed considerable deference.
The Andrade case has been granted certiorari and will be heard
"in tandem" with Ewing v. California, a case involving grand
theft.' These two cases will not provide the occasion for the Su-
preme Court to consider the constitutionality of Three Strikes, but
it may provide the opportunity for a badly fractured Court to re-
solve the issue of whether proportionality review is required and
what constitutional principles animate that review.
123. Id. at 1027.
124. People v. Mantanez, 98 Cal. App. 4th 354, 364 (2002)
125. Andrade v. Attorney General of California, 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted Apr. 1, 2002, No. 01-6978, __ U.S. __ [122 S. Ct. 1434 (2002)]; People v. Ewing
(Apr. 25, 2001, B143745) [nonpub. opn.], cert. granted Apr. 1, 2002, No. 01-6978, __ U.S.
- [122 S. Ct. 1434 (2002)].
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